Analysing Principal-Agent Relationships in Liberia in the course of the Ebola Crisis

It was not lengthy after 2020 started that residents world-wide realized it might be marked by COVID-19. Following the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January thirtieth, 2020 by the World Health Organization (WHO), the COVID-19 outbreak  was additional declared a pandemic on March eleventh, 2020, 12 days earlier than the United Kingdom’s (UK) Prime Minister Boris Johnson put the nation underneath a lockdown. As lockdown progressed, folks tried to return to phrases with the realities of the state of affairs. A worrying development, although, got here to mild within the weeks that adopted the UK’s lockdown: folks from sure UK communities, particularly from BAME (Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic) communities, gave the impression to be extra liable to contracting and dying from COVID-19. Despite these communities making up 14 % of the inhabitants, 35 % of 2000 intensive-care unit beds have been occupied by folks from BAME communities.^[1]

This analysis doesn’t give attention to this phenomenon, nonetheless. I state it right here to explain how I selected to embark on the analysis journey of this paper. The insights with reference to the BAME communities and COVID-19 level to a bigger set of questions arising within the present PHEIC. How do marginalized communities and the federal government work together in such a state of affairs and what are the federal government’s duties?

I selected to take my evaluation to the worldwide degree and take a look at the newest and most comparable expertise of a PHEIC: the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, occurring from 2013 to 2016. What I discovered was that certainly the relationships between residents from part of the world marginalized economically, socially and politically within the worldwide group; the political leaders of West Africa; and worldwide actors supplied bountiful fodder for evaluation.

I outlined my universe of instances because the three most-affected nations in West Africa, particularly Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia and commenced to review them in-depth. Indeed, some analysis exists which has already begun to know the interactions of those three sorts of actors in the course of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Research specializing in the connection between West African residents and their governments has analysed how perceptions of presidency capability carried out throughout Ebola. For instance, Nuriddin et al. (2018) level to the constructive correlation between the capability of governmental well being care providers in the course of the 2015 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone and group belief. Furthermore, a better physique of literature has begun analysing perceptions of West Africans, notably residents, in the course of the Ebola disaster. For instance, the work of Ali et al. (2015) argues that the Western world’s characterization of Ebola-ridden international locations was strongly contaminated with racist tropes and served to stigmatize West Africans.^[2]  In a very telling passage, Ali et al. write:

In this kind of colonialist discourse, “other” components of the world are depicted as harmful, notably these with “warm climates” from the place “new and emerging diseases” are seen to emanate within the twenty-first century.^[3]

However, though analysis has begun analysing the roles of principals and brokers throughout a PHEIC in a growing context, the analysis on West Africa and its intra- and inter-state relations throughout Ebola stays basically sparse, maybe marred by the shortage of knowledge on this area. That is why I formulate my three analysis questions as comply with:

First Research Question: Did the Liberian public’s belief of their President and Parliament (Y variable) lower or improve as new instances of Ebola (X variable) sprung up within the 2011 to 2018 interval?^[4]

Second Research Question: How did the Liberian authorities tackle its residents and in the course of the 2014 to 2016 Ebola disaster?

Third Research Question: How did the worldwide group view Liberian leaders and residents in the course of the Ebola disaster?

I select to reply these questions as a result of they assist us perceive the construction of principal-agent dynamics as illustrated in Figure 1. The information I selected to analyse was primarily chosen primarily based on availability. Since the notion of the Liberian authorities by the Liberian residents is quantifiable, I function with that information. The different relationships can’t be supported by quantifiable information; thus I select to take a look at qualitative information. In Figure 1, the general image of this analysis is offered. I intention to discover relationships A, B, C, and F with previous literature supporting information about relationships B, C and F. Much extra work stays to be accomplished to know the workings of every relationship circulation, particularly E.

Applying regression evaluation and discourse evaluation to quantitative and qualitative information, particularly Afrobarometer survey information from three survey rounds spanning years from 2011 to 2018 and roughly 40 pages of speeches from Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Doctor Margaret Chan, Doctor Joanne Liu, Barack Obama, and David Nabarro, I discover that:

First Argument: There is a transparent adverse correlation between Liberian public belief of their President and Parliament and the variety of new Ebola instances rising. Specifically, for each one Ebola case, the proportion of the Liberian public trusting their President “A lot” decreases by 0.0039 individuals whereas the proportion trusting their Parliament “A lot” decreases by 0.0029 individuals.

Second Argument: The Liberian state sought to justify its actions vis-à-vis the Liberian public as public belief was reducing whereas the worldwide group painted Liberia as incapable of controlling Ebola.

Third Argument: International actors finally perpetuated a picture of the Liberian state as with out company, authority, or sovereignty and thus in want of saving by Western-influenced worldwide actors. Furthermore, Liberian residents have been constructed as “noble savages” by these identical worldwide actors.

Before presenting the literature related to this matter, the analysis design, my findings and additional discussions and conclusion, I briefly present background information of the context of Liberia, Ebola and the worldwide actors concerned.

Present-day Liberia was based in 1822 as a colony of the United States of America. Liberia was based by the American Colonization Society which was shaped within the United States (US) in 1816 with the aim of colonizing a spot for free-born Black Americans and former slaves to reside. On July 26, 1847, Liberia declared its independence from the United States, starting an extended historical past of political and financial domination by its American colonizers, regardless of having been inhabited by differing ethnic teams for at the least a millennium. The Americo-Liberians, constituting solely two % of the inhabitants, made up practically one hundred pc of voters, and voted in a single celebration, the True Whig Party, from the 1860s to the Nineteen Sixties. On April 12, 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Okay. Doe overthrew the President, William Tolbert, and instituted a navy dictatorship which lasted till 1989 when a number of completely different factions vied for the nation’s management after the lack of US help. After the invasion of Liberia by Americo-Liberian Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front in 1989 and the 1990 assassination of Doe, a seven-year-long civil battle ensued which ended with a peace settlement and the 1997 election win by Taylor. However, by 2001, two insurgent teams started warring with Taylor’s authorities forces and a brand new, three-year-long civil battle started. The battle ended at a peace summit in Ghana in 2002, when the group Women of Liberia, Mass Action for Peace salvaged talks that had failed between Taylor and the 2 insurgent teams. In 2005, one of many leaders of WLMAP, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf started what could be a 12-year lengthy tenure as Liberia’s President and Africa’s first feminine head of state. Sirleaf led the nation by way of the Ebola disaster which started in Liberia in Foya on March 30, 2014. With the height of the outbreak occurring in August and September 2014 and 42 days of no-transmission lastly having handed in June 2016, Ebola had left Liberia having killed roughly 4810 folks. The Ebola outbreak in Liberia warranted a wide-ranging international response, together with main efforts by the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the WHO, Médecins sans Frontières, and particular person governments akin to Cuba and Germany.

I. Literature Review

Principal-Agent Theory

Inspired by the work of Kamradt-Scott (2016) which judges the WHO’s actions in the course of the Ebola outbreak contemplating its place as an agent of principal nation states, this work rests on Principal-Agent Theory, as utilized to intra- and inter-state relations. Hawkins et al. (2006) present a definition of Principal-Agent Theory from which I revenue: “The relations between a principal and an agent are always governed by a contract […] To be a principal, an actor must be able to both grant authority and rescind it”.^[5] The set-up of Principal-Agent Theory, by which one actor, the principal, authorizes (by way of a contract) one other actor, an agent, to signify their greatest pursuits or act on their behalf, lends itself properly to analysing the relations between residents and people they elected to authorities and between states and worldwide actors. This is as a result of in a principal-agent setup a vital delegation of pursuits exists which may doubtlessly go mistaken. I don’t right here analyse what went mistaken nor why, not to mention body such an evaluation referring to the standard info asymmetries ensuing from the Principal-Agent drawback (ethical hazard and adversarial choice), opting as an alternative to quantify and visualize that relationship as embodied between Liberian residents and their politicians at a sure cut-off date, and the way worldwide brokers might view these Liberian principals (the residents).

Public Trust

When talking of public belief, students most frequently seek advice from it within the framework of the public belief doctrine which refers to the truth that sure pure and cultural items are protected, by the federal government, for public use.^[6]

Relatedly, there exists additionally the idea of the general public belief, which is a company managing sources for not-for-profits or different organizations serving residents in want.^[7]

However, the idea of belief analysed right here is completely different. It is said to the belief which the Liberian citizenry has in its democratic establishments. Such an idea could be traced again to the fourth century BCE in Thucydides’ account of the Mytilenean Debate. In a current development, students of political science have labored to learn from the contributions of classical works in defining belief. Thus, Mara (2001) writes that Thucydides’ account factors to the necessity for constructing belief amongst the residents in direction of rulers exactly in an effort to construct solidarity in overcoming moments of weak point in buying the frequent good.

The pursuit of defining public belief is additional difficult by the difficulty of causality. Namely, pre-existing or present perceptions might taint the extent to which authorities efficiency impacts residents’ belief. Van de Waale and Bouckaert (2011) write on this subject and conclude that, “actual performance is not equal to perceived performance”.^[8] This is a vital methodological consideration however implementing its findings into analysis design is past the breadth of this examine.

Thus, I decide to give attention to a extra slim facet of public belief. Perhaps essentially the most well-known evaluation of belief in social science has been Robert D. Putnam’s Theory of Social Capital. Putnam’s thesis is that top ranges of social belief (as a social worth) on the combination degree, mixed with particular norms and plentiful networks, results in a “high level of political integration”.^[9] Although flawed by logical circularity (social capital is concurrently a trigger and an impact), Putnam’s enter is worth it for flagging the connection between public belief and its connections and potential impacts on political and democratic success.

For the needs of this analysis, I go for a definition supplied by Gambetta (1998):

Trust […] is a selected degree of the subjective likelihood with which an agent assesses that one other agent or group of brokers will carry out a selected motion, each earlier than he can monitor such motion (or independently of his capability ever to have the ability to monitor it) and in a context by which it impacts his personal motion.^[10]

This succinct definition captures what I think about public belief to be on the person foundation. I undertake this definition and pool it to the mixture, showcasing what the Liberian public’s belief is as a relationship vis-à-vis the Liberian authorities.

Public Trust in Liberia

Theoretically, the idea of public belief in literature specializing in Liberia, and even Western Africa for that matter, remained comparatively scant till the mid to late 2000s, after warring had ceased in 2003-2004. Thus, a lot of the literature not specializing in the connection between public belief and Ebola focuses on the wrestle to (re-)construct public belief after the Liberian civil wars. The matters that are most frequently addressed are safety sector reforms, corruption and state funds.

Sherif and Maina (2013) critically assess the federal government’s provision of decentralised safety and justice providers by way of the creation of regional hubs. The creator argues that the hub mannequin “bears promise”, however that it “hinges on the ability of the state to […] regain the trust of its citizens”.^[11]

When critically assessing the drawdown of UNMIL, Podder (2013) argues that together with native actors in safety sector reform is essential not solely to the success of the reforms however for public satisfaction total. Podder writes that, “efforts remain disengaged with the public perception […] This oversight has to be rectified to minimize negative impacts of security transition […]”^[12]

Whilst highlighting the significance of public belief in making certain state stability and consolidation, Karim (2017) presents two new standards for “assessing security sector reforms’ effect on confidence in the security sector […]”^[13] Her standards of restraint and inclusiveness extra particularly translate into insurance policies which embrace females within the safety sector.

Beekman, Bulte and Nillesen (2014) attempt to measure the willingness to contribute to public items as perceived corruption will increase. They conclude that, “corrupt leadership attenuates […] investment incentives”.^[14]

Finally, Gujadhur (2011) analyses the teachings learnt in Liberia in efforts to implement financial governance reforms whereas additionally constructing public belief within the 2006 to 2011 interval. He takes Liberia to be successful story on this respect, arguing that regardless of the colossal monetary constraints confronted by the Sirleaf administration because of the civil wars, a stability between worldwide and native pursuits was struck to the good thing about the nation.

Public Trust and Ebola

Two broad classes, together with consideration paid to native responses and inclusion in wider therapy programmes and the causal relationship between belief, worry, and (non-)compliance, govern the literature on public belief and Ebola.

Much of the literature typically focuses on essential reforms for future PHEICs. For instance, Kruk et al. (2015) level to the connection between resilient health-care methods and the federal government’s capability to comprise worry when emergencies strike. More particularly, resilient well being care methods, declare the authors, are more proficient at containing fearful reactions of the general public.

Bemah et al. (2019), level to the specificities of coaching programmes and analyse that are extra productive in correctly coaching native employees in administering protected and high quality providers (SQSs) in Ebola therapy items (ETUs).  They argue that native well being care employees should obtain refresher coaching in an effort to improve emergency preparedness.

However, facets of the Liberian response have been praised. When learning the native hospitals’ state of affairs reviews, Fallah, Dahn and Nyenswah (2016) argue that community-based initiatives (CBIs) have been crucial in slicing the transmission chain of Ebola, a feat accomplished sooner than its two neighbours Sierra Leone and Guinea, each of which have a better per capita GDP than Liberia.

The analysis of Barker et al. (2020) takes Fallah, Dahn and Nyenswah’s analysis a step additional. Barker et al. argue that though it might be clear that area people empowerment in public well being emergency responses is essential, it’s nonetheless not clear which mode of facilitation of community-centred approaches works. Thus, the researchers check which types of group engagement (CE) had a significant impression and located that approaches which deal with native communities as lively brokers within the response quite than as passive receivers of well being providers supplied the best success fee. Thus, insurance policies akin to initiating community-based surveillance groups elevated belief in well being authorities” which “facilitated health system response efforts” all “leading to a fortuitous cycle”.^[15]

The 2020 paper by Blair, Morse, Tsai examined the effectiveness of the Liberian authorities’s door-to-door canvassing marketing campaign from 2014 to 2015 and located that it was simpler when native intermediaries carried out it as they have been then topic to “monitoring and sanctioning”, thus making them appear “more accountable and credible”.^[16]

Vinck et al. (2018) check the impact of low belief in authorities on Ebola beliefs and subsequent practises. They discover that “low institutional trust [is] associated with a decreased likelihood of adopting preventive behaviours”, while acknowledging that over 1 / 4 of their respondents didn’t imagine the outbreak was actual.^[17]

Blair, Morse and Tsai (2016) have been monumental within the area of connecting public belief to governmental responses in public well being emergencies. They check if a correlation exists between belief in authorities and compliance with Ebola-control measures. They discovered that even when respondents have been totally conscious of how Ebola is transmitted and what needs to be accomplished to decrease the danger of transmission, their indication of low belief in authorities nonetheless pushed them to not adjust to management measures. Whilst different papers have showcased the significance of belief as a variable, this paper strongly argues for belief as a central determinant in anti-transmission practises.

Within this class, there’s additionally a sub-category of micro literature specializing in results after the Ebola pandemic in Liberia.

The work of Morse et al. (2016) analyses the impression that demand-side elements akin to belief and adverse well being care experiences in the course of the Ebola outbreak have on demand for well being care after the pandemic. They discover that mistrust of authorities and a adverse Ebola-related expertise decreases health-care utilisation while government-organised group outreach applications improve it.

Elston et al. (2016) equally assess the impression on well being care authorities after the pandemic. They argue that the connection between worry, belief and use of social providers ran in a round style, i.e. worry of Ebola and well being care staff precipitated a lower in belief of the general public well being care system and thus a lower in use of it which in flip precipitated a better worry of Ebola. The authors argue that this precipitated an additional lower in “community cohesion”.^[18]

While recognizing the impact that the general public’s mistrust of the federal government has had on the success of Ebola containment, Woskie and Fallah (2019) intention to evaluate the impact of mistrust of the federal government by the general public on the availability of common healthcare protection (UHC) additionally post-pandemic. They notice {that a} mistrust of authorities continues post-pandemic and hampers efforts to institutionalize UHC.

Finally, within the ground-breaking e-book Politics of Fear (2017), former Médecins sans Frontières employees member Mit Philips recounts classes discovered in the course of the pandemic, and notes that tense “interpersonal relationships between the healthcare authorities, healthcare workers, and the general population” precipitated a discount in demand for well being care.^[19]

The International Community and its Ebola Response

The analysis of Abramowitz et al. (2017) showcases that native communities can quickly reverse the sample of thought and motion that they harbour vis-à-vis illnesses akin to Ebola, particularly in a local weather of accelerating mortality charges. The authors state that, “Global public health response […] should draw upon […] our most significant finding […] Ebola behaviour change messages were only adopted and maintained when they were seen as “realistic” or “practical”  in day by day life”.^[20] It is notable that the authors refer instantly to the worldwide response effort, with out providing recommendations for state-centred approaches. This is doubtlessly at odds with analysis akin to that from Kucharski and Piot (2014) who argue forcibly for the necessity for a world response: “The scale of the current outbreak means an international response is needed”.^[21] They state that “the international community must commit the resources required to control the outbreak”, akin to “expertise and equipment, […] financial support, […] experienced healthcare workers[,] […] additional protective clothing and isolation units”, amongst others.^[22]

Woldemariam and di Giacomo (2016) argue in opposition to a number of measures posed by the worldwide group to attempt to alleviate the Ebola disaster in Western Africa. They argue, for instance, that “campaigns to educate and raise funds for Ebola and Africa […] would have proved more effective if Africa had been represented in its many facets […] rather than as a perpetual single victim”.^[23]

Following this pressure of thought, authors have argued that the Liberian state was seen as incapable of controlling the virus primarily as a result of it was an African state. This, they argue, is evidenced by the scientifically unjustified actions on the a part of states and worldwide organizations. For instance, Tejpar and Hoffman (2017) argue that the journey restrictions instituted by Canada, alongside a number of different international locations, have been unlawful as they didn’t abide by the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR).

Roemer-Mahler and Rushton (2016) spend appreciable area criticizing the “securitization” of Ebola.^[24]  The authors argue that the worldwide group solely noticed Ebola as a safety subject and never one regarding public well being. Furthermore, it was not till the well being of Western nations was endangered that international leaders amplified their response. Furman (2017), furthermore, brings consideration to the truth that two U.S. healthcare staff and a Spanish priest have been the primary to obtain an experimental Ebola therapy. Moreover, Furman criticizes that an ethics panel which the WHO convened had no Africans current in it.

Southall, DeYoung, and Harris (2017) argue that due to Liberians’ distrust in authorities each on the nationwide and worldwide degree and “the lack of cultural competency”, native efforts to successfully reply to Liberia have been ignored and worldwide cooperation with these efforts was absent.^[25]

There is a wealthy literature discussing and criticizing the worldwide response to Ebola and, extra typically, the outlook this group has on Ebola and the Africans concerned in it.

Monson (2017) argues that mainstream information and social media within the United States (US) throughout 2014 engaged in an “othering process” by which it “reproduced and perpetuated the Ebola-is-African, Ebola-is-all-over-Africa, and Africa-is-a-country narratives”.^[26]

Ali et al. (2016) argue that the “colonial legacy” of Westerners “fan[s] the flames of fear” because it produces a “social amplification of risk”. The colonial legacy has this function, the authors argue, because it prompts a imaginative and prescient of “Africa as a site of primitivism and catastrophe” and encourages “colonial discourses of backwardness, exoticism and savagery”.^[27]

Finally, Kingsbury’s (2015) work engages immediately with media representations of Western efforts to curb Ebola in Liberia. She argues that finally the Western view “serves primarily to reinforce paternal relationships […] and a societal perception that ‘we’ are the saviours”.^[28] Trckova (2015), furthermore, argues that the illustration in US newspapers of Ebola’s victims painted them as “voiceless” and “agentless”, or as “fail[ing] to represent infected ordinary Africans as sovereign agents”.^[29]

Positioning this Research

This analysis makes an attempt to enter the conversations outlined above by setting up an image of principal-agent relations which goals to know the function of those three actors of their rights and tasks to one another but in addition their perceptions of Self and the Other by additional participating with themes of public belief and Western supremacy. This snapshot is missing and represents the first and important hole within the literature. Less typically, this analysis goals to contribute to the prevailing literature by quantifying and visualizing the connection of public belief in Liberia throughout a PHEIC, connecting public belief in its authorities to the visions of worldwide brokers, and critically analysing the speech merchandise of those worldwide brokers.

II. Data and Methodology

Case examine

Firstly, it’s crucial to delineate what precisely a case examine is. I function with Gerring’s (2006) definition:

Case connotes a spatially delineated phenomenon (a unit) noticed […] over some time period. It includes the kind of phenomenon that an inference makes an attempt to elucidate.^[30]

Thus, as Gerring factors out, a case examine consists of a unit which the analysis research in depth to succeed in observations in regards to the phenomenon itself, its traits and so on.

When learning Ebola in Africa throughout its most up-to-date outbreak (from 2014 to 2016), the universe of instances from which to decide on embrace Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal, alongside the worst-affected international locations in West Africa, together with Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

The course of of choosing one case to review thought-about the varied and congruent elements of the international locations, akin to demographic make-up, financial power, and the impact Ebola had on the nation. In selecting a case greatest fitted to reply the analysis questions and which might not be hindered by the quite a few completely different variables amongst the universe of instances, Liberia was chosen as a paradigmatic case. A paradigmatic case is “an exemplar”, a case emblematic of an occasion however one which doesn’t essentially share typical traits with different comparable instances.^[31]

This analysis doesn’t intention to supply causal claims with the information analysed. To reply the analysis questions, a ‘Mixed methods’ method, i.e. one which “collect[s] and analyse[s] both quantitative and qualitative data within the same study” is adopted because the analysis questions encourage this method.^[32] The quantitative information and evaluation is employed to acquire a transparent and dependable visualization of the connection between Ebola instances in Liberia and public belief, whereas the qualitative information and evaluation was employed to find the photographs of fellow worldwide actors that every respective actor underneath evaluation created. The solutions will probably be thought-about enough as soon as the evaluation has come out from the information exploration with a transparent adverse or constructive correlation between the 2 variables within the first analysis query, and a wealthy set of themes (at the least 5) to reply the final two analysis questions.

Data

The quantitative information is from Afrobarometer’s on-line database of survey rounds and from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). I take a look at three survey rounds (2011-2013, 2014-2015, and 2016-2018) from Afrobarometer to get as sturdy an image as potential, combining it with the variety of new instances rising in Liberia from 2014 to 2016. I select two particular survey questions and plot the proportion of individuals responding (the common variety of respondents being 1199) with a belief degree of “A lot” to those three questions:

Survey Question 1: How a lot do you belief every of the next, or haven’t you heard sufficient about them to say: The President?

Survey Question 2: How a lot do you belief every of the next, or haven’t you heard sufficient about them to say: Parliament?

I select the President and Parliament as a result of these have been the 2 strongest and lively governmental respondents in Liberia’s Ebola expertise. Survey questions do current the potential for biased solutions, maybe by pushing the respondents to reply in a sure manner. However, of the information obtainable, I decide this information to be the closest approximation of subjective attitudes of belief in Liberia. Moreover, the questions haven’t been acknowledged in a suggestive manner.

The qualitative information consists of publicly-available speeches by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (President of Liberia from 2006 to 2018), Doctor Margaret Chan (Director-General of the WHO from 2006 to 2017), Doctor Joanne Liu (International President of MSF from 2013 to 2019), Barack Obama (President of the US from 2009 to 2017), and David Nabarro (Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General on Ebola from 2014 to 2015). This readily-available information signifies the utterances concerning the Ebola disaster in Liberia of the main related political figures of the time. I apply discourse evaluation to roughly 40 pages of textual content, equalling round 13,400 phrases.

Quantitative Analysis

In this analysis, I exploit quantitative information and evaluation as a degree of departure for a extra intriguing, qualitative evaluation. The quantitative evaluation serves to know the “social cognition”, or the “public mind”.^[33] More particularly, the quantitative evaluation is extra so directed in direction of attaining perception, which is “the product of a good case study”.^[34] Finally, the survey information is used to seize the subjective nature of perceptions of belief, following Gambetta’s definition.

I first systematized the information in Excel to organize it for import into RStudio by aligning the evolution of the variety of new instances and the survey responses to the identical timeframe.

I then imported the information into RStudio, after which I coded for a regression mannequin and visualized this mannequin by making a LOESS regression picture to extra flexibly point out the connection between the variety of new Ebola instances in Liberia and the variety of respondents trusting the respective governmental establishment “A lot”.

Qualitative Analysis

Foucault states that energy is claimed by way of discourse, stating, “Discourse […] is the thing for which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized”.^[35] With this in thoughts, an evaluation of the discourse round Ebola by the world’s leaders can doubtlessly lay naked relations of energy within the setting studied.

I make use of van Dijk’s crucial discourse evaluation because it lends itself most formidably to the character of my analysis questions. Assuming, within the essence of Foucault and van Dijk, that discourse is the terrain for power-making and power-taking, van Dijk advises discourse analysts to method the textual content with the next query in thoughts: [What is] the function of discourse within the (re)manufacturing and problem of dominance?^[36] Thus, I analyse the official speeches of world leaders to have interaction extra immediately with power-making by way of discourse, and, fairly particularly, with the potential transgressions in opposition to democratic values. As van Dijk places it:

Critical discourse evaluation is particularly enthusiastic about energy abuse, that’s, in breaches of legal guidelines, guidelines and ideas of democracy, equality and justice by those that wield energy.^[37]

I carried out my discourse evaluation in ATLAS.ti, a software program which allowed me to code for the principle themes arising out of the texts. Searching for themes meant critically assessing, in an inductive style, speeches for tactics by which actors labored to perpetuate or vivify their positions of energy.

Ethical Considerations

This mission didn’t require moral approval, however it requires moral consideration. I be mindful Mama’s (2007) proclamation that, “For Africans, ethical scholarship is socially responsible scholarship that supports freedom […]”^[38] My intention is to concentrate on my positionality as a white, middle-class lady who has by no means visited the nation she is learning. I intention to do extra good than hurt, which is likely one of the causes I selected crucial discourse evaluation. I try to take the perspective of these most deprived.

III. Findings

A. Quantitative Analysis – Relationship B

As a degree of departure, this analysis seeks to quantitatively perceive the connection between the Liberian public’s belief in its governmental establishments and the variety of new Ebola instances rising in that nation.

Thus, a regression evaluation of the connection between the quantity of respondents (the principals) trusting a sure governmental establishment (the agent) “A lot” and the variety of new Ebola instances supplies the next outcomes.

When analysing the impact the variety of new Ebola instances (right here coded as “new_cases”) has on the quantity of Liberian survey respondents trusting the President “A lot”, the next outcomes have been obtained:

	ESTIMATE	STANDARD ERROR	t-VALUE	PR ( > | t | )
INTERCEPT	22.1721	1.1261	19.689	1.22e-12
new_cases	-0.0039	0.0011	-3.437	0.0033

The regression evaluation signifies that with the rise of 1 Ebola case the variety of respondents trusting the President “A lot” decreases, on common, by 0.0039 folks. We can even visualize these outcomes graphically in Figure 2.

This quantitative evaluation may also be executed to review the impact that the variety of new Ebola instances had on the proportion of Liberians responding that they belief their Parliament “A lot”. The outcomes of that regression evaluation are as follows.

	ESTIMATE	STANDARD ERROR	t-VALUE	PR ( > | t | )
INTERCEPT	14.1406	1.2664	11.17	5.8e-09***
new_cases	-0.0029	0.0013	-2.24	0.0396*

According to the regression evaluation, a rise of 1 Ebola case in Liberia in the course of the outbreak decreased, on common, the proportion of Liberians trusting their Parliament “A lot” by about 0.0029 folks. As a graph, this relationship is visualized within the following method.

The outcomes showcase that in Ebola a decrease proportion of individuals belief their democratic establishments “A lot” as these identical establishments have been on the defence making an attempt to bolster restricted capacities within the combat in opposition to Ebola. The quantitative evaluation doesn’t level to any causal conclusions. This might be for a wide range of causes, together with a possible presence of confounding variables. For instance, maybe the decline within the variety of folks trusting their President or Parliament “A lot” is because of one other occasion apart from Ebola. Moreover, though there’s a clear correlation, the scale of the correlation coefficient shouldn’t be notably robust, thus extra in-depth quantitative evaluation known as for. The outcomes might, nonetheless, predict comparable eventualities as Liberia presents a paradigmatic case, such because the COVID-19 expertise in Somalia.

B. Qualitative evaluation – Relationships A, C, and F

Construction of Liberia as an Incapable State

I argue that the Liberian authorities (the agent) adopted a rhetoric of justification in respect to its actions in opposition to Ebola when addressing Liberians (the principals). The worldwide group, who adopts the agent place in its relationship with Liberia, created a picture of an incapacitated state.

Throughout the Ebola disaster, President Sirleaf established a sample of justifying the Liberian authorities’s actions. In the start of a June 2014 speech made amidst rising Ebola instances, Sirleaf states, “The Government of Liberia and Partners has done this much”.^[39] In a bid to justify what her authorities has been doing, Sirleaf goes on to listing three actions which her authorities has taken to assist curb Ebola.

In a July 2014 assertion, the President spent practically everything of her speech outlining the actions which the federal government had taken in opposition to the Ebola virus. In explicit, the President outlines the creation of the National Task Force, the only authority for responding to the Ebola virus. The President doesn’t define how the Force will probably be funded, and certainly speculations have been later caused that since there was restricted transparency on the Force’s functioning, potential corruption ensued.

Instead Sirleaf jumps to the impression Ebola had on authorities establishments. Sirleaf states, “Obviously, this dreadful virus has overtasked our public health facilities and capabilities”.^[40] The phrase “obviously” right here works to get rid of criticism that it was the federal government’s (in)motion in opposition to Ebola and never Ebola itself that overtasked public well being establishments. The use of the phrase “dreadful” has an analogous operate, trying to persuade the listener that the federal government understandably been overtasked by a virus so monumental that even the federal government’s greatest efforts couldn’t have helped curb Ebola.

In a September 2014 assertion made because the variety of new instances was now reaching its peak in Liberia, Sirleaf described her authorities’s combat in opposition to Ebola as a combat in opposition to a virus which “not even the world’s experts knew” was Ebola.^[41] By creating a picture of Ebola as an unknown, mysterious virus, Sirleaf works to elicit sympathy from listeners since any failing in answering an unknown illness might be comprehensible. Tellingly, Sirleaf states that, “With limited resources and capacity, the government responded swiftly and decisively to the outbreak”.^[42] The President right here goals to current her authorities’s actions as symmetric to the dimensions of the Ebola catastrophe, reminding us that the actions have been with a handicap, particularly that of an absence of sources and capability. Finally, on the finish of the speech, Sirleaf reminds listeners that, “We acted within the scale of our capacity to contain the scale of [sic] an outbreak we could not imagine possible”.^[43]

Finally, in October 2014 on the World Bank, Sirleaf positioned Ebola as the rationale for her authorities’s stalling on the successes which Sirleaf claims her authorities achieved vis-à-vis their growth agenda. She additional claims that any faults in her authorities’s response to Ebola aren’t brought on by her authorities: “With limited understanding of the disease, low human capacity and a slow international response – the disease quickly outpaced our ability to contain it”.^[44] Sirleaf right here additionally signifies that accountability for the illness outpacing any authorities containment efforts rests additionally with the inaction of the worldwide group.

This analysis doesn’t recommend that Sirleaf mustn’t have justified her actions or that she didn’t make comprehensible statements, however quite goals to take a look at what rhetoric Liberia, as a paradigmatic growing state, adopts throughout a PHEIC; it’s one among justification.

The worldwide group, in the meantime, labored to create a picture of Liberia (and West Africa as a complete) as incapable of answering to the disaster. For instance, Barack Obama ignored any state-led makes an attempt at assuaging the disaster and as an alternative merely acknowledged, on the United Nations in September 2014, “In Liberia, in Guinea, in Sierra Leone, public health systems have collapsed”.^[45]

Another instance arises from Doctor Margaret Chan March 2015 speech:

Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are among the many poorest international locations on the planet. At the beginning of the outbreak, all three had solely just lately emerged from years of civil battle and unrest that left primary well being infrastructures broken or destroyed and created a cohort of younger adults with little or no training.^[46]

Chan once more referred to as these three international locations the “poorest and least prepared countries on Earth” at her November 2nd, 2015 tackle on the Princeton-Fung Global Forum. Chan thus creates a picture of Liberia as an incapacitated state. Instead of acknowledging what the federal government had accomplished, Chan chooses as an alternative to color, by way of a Western gaze, a stereotypical image of Liberia as a spot ravaged by battle, poverty and an absence of training. She moreover ignores the specificities of Western African nations, akin to the truth that their GDPs, though amongst the bottom 50 of the world on the time, nonetheless differed (their 2016 GDPs in USD measured seven, 4, and two billion for Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, respectively).^[47]

Construction of International Actors as Saviours

I argue that worldwide actors securitized Ebola as a world subject, formulating a public well being disaster in Liberia and its neighbouring states as a menace to worldwide safety. Moreover, they regarded Liberia as incapable of controlling Ebola, thus denying the Liberian state its company and authority. Finally, worldwide actors positioned themselves because the saviours of Liberia from its incapacity to manage Ebola and thus saviours of the world, even denying Liberia’s sovereignty by doing so.

In his September 2014 UN speech, Obama denied the Liberian state its company and authority by securitizing Ebola, after which he labored to posit the United States as the only, unquestioned saviour of the area and the world from Ebola’s menace. At the very starting of the speech, Obama frames Ebola as “an urgent threat to the people of West Africa, but also a potential threat to the world”.^[48] Obama thus sees Ebola greater than only a well being disaster in West Africa; he sees it as a possible menace to his personal nation thus signalling that Ebola is of significance to him solely as a safety menace. Obama continues to align Ebola as a global safety subject which West Africa is incapable of caring for when he says, “[…] this is also more than a health crisis[,] [it] is a growing threat to regional and global security.”^[49] It is at this level that Obama has already constructed West Africa and thus Liberia as a rustic with out authority within the worldwide stage as it’s incapable of controlling a virus which can pose a menace to the world. It was at this level that the worldwide group stepped in to behave, not whereas the PHEIC was extra localized in West Africa.^[50]

Responding to an incapable Liberia, Obama proceeds to place the United States as the only, unquestioned chief on the world stage, bringing materials assist and experience solely it could actually present:

Last week, I visited the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which is mounting the most important worldwide response in its historical past.  I mentioned that the world may rely on America to guide, and that we are going to present the capabilities that solely we have now, and mobilize the world the best way we have now accomplished up to now in crises of comparable magnitude.  And I introduced that, along with the civilian response, the United States would set up a navy command in Liberia to help civilian efforts throughout the area.^[51]

Obama highlights his personal actions predominantly on this assertion, and people of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a public well being institute within the United States. Nowhere does he point out what West African leaders have accomplished, insurance policies which they’ve proposed, or assist they’ve requested.

Finally, Obama pronounces the US’s plan to arrange a navy command in Liberia, ignoring questions of respect for Liberian sovereignty and the existence of UNMIL in Liberia already, or any actions they could have taken.

Throughout her September 2014 UN speech, Liu created a picture which proposed that MSF was the one actor interesting for worldwide assist, denying company, authority, and sovereignty to Liberia. For instance, Liu states, “I am forced to reiterate the appeal I made two weeks ago. We need you on the ground”.^[52] Liu ignores the existence of constant pleas for worldwide assist from a number of West African leaders and Sirleaf specifically. Moreover, Liu repeatedly introduced up the actions MSF was enterprise and framed her group because the actor commissioning the best effort within the Ebola response.

As of immediately, MSF has despatched greater than 420 tonnes of provides to the affected international locations. We have 2,000 employees on the bottom. We handle greater than 530 beds in 5 completely different Ebola care centres. Yet we’re overwhelmed.  We are truthfully at a loss as to how a single, non-public NGO is offering the majority of isolation items and beds.^[53]

Liu doesn’t acknowledge the actions of locals or the state, or the truth that MSF had develop into a primary responder solely after authorities well being establishments reached breaking level. 

Construction of Liberian Citizens as Primeval

Finally, I argue that world leaders created an exotified picture of Liberians (who’re, in relation to them, principals) as “noble savages” and Liberia as being the antithesis of contemporary.

This is maybe most potently manifest within the speeches of Doctor Margaret Chan. In her March 2015 speech, Chan started by characterizing Ebola as an “exotic pathogen”.^[54] Why would Ebola be an unique pathogen? If one is to make use of the dictionary definition of unique, then Ebola, a illness not unknown nor mysterious since 1976, is equated to being “non-native”. Chan right here solidifies the WHO’s gaze as non-African since Ebola wouldn’t be one thing unique if Chan regarded the WHO as a very worldwide group made by and for all international locations. Instead, she posits Ebola and thus Liberia, as a West African nation, because the WHO’s Other.

Chan continues her problematic characterization of Ebola by pitting Ebola and Liberia in distinction to modernity, urbanism and class. In her November 2015 speech, Chan placess Ebola in disparity to earlier plagues, notably to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which she characterizes as a “modern plague”, main the listener to imagine that Ebola is in some way not a contemporary plague.^[55] Since Chan has equated Ebola to Africa and Ebola as not trendy, she equates Africa as not trendy.

Chan additionally works to create a dichotomy between “sophisticated” and “urban”, particularly the descriptors of the locations the place SARS occurred, and the “poor” and “least prepared” locations the place Ebola occurred, when stating:

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa advanced inside a really completely different context. Whereas SARS was largely a illness of refined city settings, Ebola took its heaviest toll on three of the poorest and least ready international locations on earth.^[56]

She ignores that the delicate and concrete locations additionally had an incredible problem earlier than them when coping with SARS as a result of they too have been poorly ready. Moreover, Ebola was confronted in all three capital cities of West Africa, particularly Monrovia, Conakry and Freetown, and that being poor and fewer ready, even when true, wouldn’t equate West Africa to being an unsophisticated rural setting.

Furthermore, Chan imagines Liberians as “noble savages”, or as harmless and uncivilized people unable to manage emotion with purpose. For instance, Chan positions Ebola as a predator preying on harmless Liberians’ cultural practises, when stating:

But above all, the virus exploited West Africa’s deep-seated cultural traditions.^[57]

This can also be seen when Chan mobilizes the language of Ebola as a marauder attacking Liberians’ emotional financial system.

Ebola preyed on one other deep-seated cultural trait: compassion.^[58]

Chan argues that when Ebola assaults compassion in care-taking practises, it assaults one thing particularly Liberian. By assuming that compassion is one thing explicit to Liberia and West Africa, Chan initiates as soon as once more the method of Othering that she does all through all her speeches to place the WHO’s gaze as divergent to Liberians.

This sample was continued in Chan’s November 2015 tackle the place she additional characterised Liberia and its residents as exacerbating the unfold of Ebola by way of “centuries-old cultural beliefs and traditions” and indicated the Liberians have been in some way caught up to now.

 IV. Discussion

This analysis was impressed by issues of how public belief operates in a growing setting throughout a PHEIC, how the growing state positions itself throughout such an occasion, and the way worldwide actors function vis-à-vis that state. A crucial overview of the analysis pointed to a physique of information outlining the significance of public belief throughout a PHEIC, its empirical manifestation in Liberia in the course of the Ebola disaster, and the style by which worldwide actors seen the Liberian state and its residents in the course of the Ebola disaster. Work akin to that of Blair, Morse, and Tsai (2016) establishes that residents didn’t comply with anti-transmission practises issued by the federal government, even after they believed in them, due to their indication that they didn’t belief the federal government sufficient. Moreover, analysis akin to that of Monson (2017) argues that:

The US information media tapped into Americans’ worry and conceptualization of Ebola as “other”, “scary”, and “African”, which led to the othering of Africa, Africans, and people coming back from Africa.^[59]

However, the analysis physique stays considerably repetitive and scant given the under-studied nature of the area and the truth that occasions have been comparatively current. The literature, furthermore, doesn’t create a wider conceptual picture of the very explicit developmental setting and occasions which occurred and doesn’t query the altering roles of the residents, the state and worldwide actors as principals and brokers.

This analysis faucets into the obtainable information to supply a snapshot of what relationships between the three actors seemed like earlier than, throughout, and after Ebola. The information and its evaluation may have taken many different types. For instance, face-to-face interviews would offer a extra sturdy and detailed dataset for evaluation. An interview with David Nabarro, as an example, may present extra info on his views on Liberians, as the information right here didn’t present, surprisingly so, conclusive findings. However, I select to analyse information not analysed earlier than which lends itself elegantly to quantitative and discourse evaluation, offering a convincing image. Practical issues additionally play a task; contacting actors throughout a pandemic and notably these in Liberia is a tough job with the sources offered. Beyond the information, strategies of approaching it is also improved. Firstly, analysis with better time, cash and area limits would do properly to analyse how the roles of principals and brokers change throughout a PHEIC or how the roles of 1 actor, such because the citizenry, change. Secondly, one other method could be to conduct an in-depth comparative case examine the place the expertise of Ebola in Liberia might be in comparison with the expertise of COVID-19 in one other growing and even developed nation. For instance, an analogous outlook might be utilized to neighbouring Sierra Leone and Guinea to analyse potential similarities and/or variations. Finally, a doubtlessly bountiful space of analysis could be to supply a gender evaluation of Liberia and/or different international locations’ expertise of PHEICs. Most nurses caring for Liberian Ebola sufferers have been ladies, and of the 5 (inter)nationwide leaders whose speeches are right here analysed, three are ladies. A gendered evaluation would vastly serve the development of a classy snapshot.

Why is it vital to color an image of the relations between these three several types of actors throughout Ebola anyhow? I supply three primary causes, every relating to 1 sort of actor and unmistakably positioning them throughout the context of a PHEIC. Firstly, it’s crucial to debate what function growing states have in stopping and answering to crises in public well being. As threats to public well being more and more deny the existence of synthetic borders in a globalized world, growing states are left with out the capability to stop and management outbreaks which threaten entire areas and even the world. Yet, because the expertise of Ebola reveals, it was the nation-state which was at first in responding to Ebola. Finally, the function of the worldwide group in responding to PHEICs in growing contexts have to be critically re-examined. Many questions right here come up that want answering: whose pursuits do worldwide actors signify, how do they place themselves vis-à-vis growing states’ leaders and residents, and do their actions work in practise or falter? For instance, the expertise of Ebola in Liberia reveals {that a} lack of cultural sensitivity on the a part of worldwide actors and their messages created a bent to disregard anti-transmission practises. Secondly, issues of the function native communities have throughout PHEICs, whether or not they be the BAME group within the UK or residents of Monrovia’s slums, are more and more pertinent. The expertise of Ebola in Liberia dictates that area people engagement is pivotal in reversing transmission developments and implementing a complete host of constructive public well being insurance policies, such because the tailoring of applications to native situations for elevated effectiveness.

Finally, this analysis hopes to encourage insurance policies implementing its insights into practise. Prospective insurance policies embrace additional enhancing the resilience and flexibility of growing states’ well being methods and doing this particularly on the native degree the place residents and native leaders are greatest adept at responding with information of native cultural norms throughout PHEICs. This would imply way more shut contact to native leaders, or implementation of regional hubs, as detailed by Sherif and Maina (2013), however for the adaption of well being and never safety coverage. Another potential coverage space would spring from a crucial questioning of the WHO’s functioning. This is a very salient coverage area immediately because the US, one of many WHO’s largest donors, leaves that organisation. For the WHO to nonetheless be related, it might want to assess its personal principal-agent relations with every nation, particularly these with struggling well being methods.

V. Conclusion

This analysis posits that because the variety of new Ebola instances rises, public belief declines whereas additionally showcasing the truth that the Liberian state sought to justify its actions while worldwide actors noticed themselves as saviours and Liberians and Ebola-ridden Liberia as backwards.

I wish to end off by offering area for the scantily obtainable voice of Liberian Ebola survivors whereas showcasing native actions. Following the perception that Ebola can exist in semen for as much as 18 months, efforts such because the Men’s Health Screening Program supply sexual and psychological well being help to males who’ve had Ebola. Participants spotlight the significance of locals administering applications which regard delicate issues associated to intercourse and Ebola. Through the programme, hope is born in Liberian survivors who’ve created the motto: I will probably be profitable. I will probably be beneficial. I’ll make an impression.^[60]

Appendices

Appendix 1: R Code

## Liberians’ Trust of their President earlier than, throughout, and after Ebola ##

names(Test_4)[names(Test_4) == “new cases”] <- “new_cases”

names(Test_4)[names(Test_4) == “trust in president”] <- “trust_in_president”

lmTest4 = lm(trust_in_president~new_cases, information = Test_4)

abstract(lmTest4)

x <- Test_4$new_cases

y <- Test_4$trust_in_president

plot(x, y, primary = “Liberians’ trust in their President as Ebola cases rise (2011-2018)”,

            xlab = “New Ebola Cases in Liberia”, ylab = “Liberians’ trust in their President”)

mannequin <- loess(y ~ x , Test_4)

new.Test_4 <- information.body(x, y)

new.Test_4$match <- predict(mannequin, new.Test_4)

with(x, y, plot(x, y, ylim=c(0,5)))

with(new.Test_4, strains(x, match))

## Liberians’ Trust of their Parliament earlier than, throughout, and after Ebola ##

names(Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel)[names(Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel) == “new_cases”] <- “new_cases”

names(Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel)[names(Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel) == “trust_parl”] <- “trust_parl”

lm_Test_Parl = lm(trust_parl~new_cases, information = Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel)

abstract(lm_Test_Parl)

x <- Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel$new_cases

y <- Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel$trust_parl

plot(x, y, primary = “Liberians’ trust in their Parliament as Ebola cases rise (2011-2018)”,

            xlab = “New Ebola Cases in Liberia”, ylab = “Liberians’ trust in their Parliament”)

mannequin <- loess(y ~ x , Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel)

new.Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel <- information.body(x, y)

new.Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel$match <- predict(mannequin, new.Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel)

with(x, y, plot(x, y, ylim=c(0,5)))

with(new.Cases_Parl_Trust_Excel, strains(x, match))

Appendix 2: Time sequence survey information showcasing Liberians’ belief of their President as offered on Afrobarometer

Appendix 3: Time sequence survey information showcasing Liberians’ belief of their President as offered on Afrobarometer

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Pellecchia, Umberto, Rosa Crestani, Tom Decroo, Rafael Van den Bergh, and Yasmine Al-Kourdi. “Social Consequences of Ebola Containment Measures in Liberia.” Edited by Lidia Adriana Braunstein. PLOS ONE 10, no. 12 (December 9, 2015): e0143036. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143036.

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Podder, Sukanya. “Bridging the ‘Conceptual–Contextual’ Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 353–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.770242.

“PUBLIC TRUST | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary,” NA. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/public-trust.

“Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” July 1, 2020. https://www.imf.org/exterior/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=43&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&type=nation&ds=.&br=1&c=668percent2C724percent2C656&s=NGDPD&grp=0&a=.

Richardson Oakes, Anne. “Judicial Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine: A Powerful Tool of Environmental Protection?” Transnational Environmental Law 7, no. 3 (September 17, 2018): 469–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102518000213.

Roemer-Mahler, Anne, and Simon Rushton. “Introduction: Ebola and International Relations.” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 3 (March 3, 2016): 373–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1118343.

Sabuni, Louis Paluku. “Dilemma With the Local Perception of Causes of Illnesses in Central Africa: Muted Concept but Prevalent in Everyday Life.” Qualitative Health Research 17, no. 9 (November 1, 2007): 1280–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732307307864.

Sarah Monson. “Ebola as African: American Media Discourses of Panic and Otherization.” Africa Today 63, no. 3 (April 1, 2017): 3. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.63.3.02.

Scott, Vera, Sarah Crawford-Browne, and David Sanders. “Critiquing the Response to the Ebola Epidemic through a Primary Health Care Approach.” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (May 17, 2016): 410. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3071-4.

Sherif, and Maina. “Enhancing Security and Justice in Liberia.” ACCORD (weblog), March 1, 2013. https://www.accord.org.za/publication/enhancing-security-and-justice-in-liberia/.

Shorten, Allison, and Joanna Smith. “Mixed Methods Research: Expanding the Evidence Base.” Evidence Based Nursing 20, no. 3 (July 26, 2017): 74–75. https://doi.org/10.1136/eb-2017-102699.

Siddique, Haroon, and Sarah Marsh. “Inquiry Announced into Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus on BAME Communities.” The Guardian, April 16, 2020, sec. World information. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/inquiry-disproportionate-impact-coronavirus-bame.

Siisiainen, and Martti. “(PDF) Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam.” ResearchGate, January 1, 2000. https://www.researchgate.web/publication/200031251_Two_Concepts_of_Social_Capital_Bourdieu_vs_Putnam.

Sirleaf. “A Special Statement by the President,” July 28, 2014. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special%20Statement%20bypercent20President%20Ellen%20Johnson%20Sirleaf%20-1_1.pdf.

———. “Nationwide Statement by Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf President of the Republic of Liberia on the Ebola Virus,” June 8, 2014. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Nationwide%20Statement%20onpercent20thepercent20Ebola%20viruspercent20bypercent20thepercent20President%20ofpercent20thepercent20percent20Republic%20ofpercent20Liberia,%20Madam%20Ellen%20Johnson%20Sirleaf(1).pdf.

———. “Nationwide Statement by Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf President of the Republic of Liberia on the Ebola Virus,” September 9, 2014. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/WorldBank_Statement.pdf.

———. “Special Statement by Ellen Johson Sirleaf On Additional Measures in the Fight against the Ebola Viral Disease,” July 30, 2014. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special_State_Delivered_July%2030.pdf.

———. “Statement by Her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on the Update of the Ebola Crisis,” September 17, 2014. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Nation_Address-17092014.pdf.

Southall, Hannah Grace, Sarah E. DeYoung, and Curt Andrew Harris. “Lack of Cultural Competency in International Aid Responses: The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia.” Frontiers in Public Health 5 (January 31, 2017). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2017.00005.

AidWeb. “Surviving Ebola: Public Perceptions of Governance and the Outbreak Response in Liberia – Liberia,” June 30, 2015. https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/surviving-ebola-public-perceptions-governance-and-outbreak-response-liberia.

Tejpar, Ali, and Steven J. Hoffman. “Canada’s Violation of International Law during the 2014–16 Ebola Outbreak.” Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 54 (October 2, 2017): 366–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/cyl.2017.18.

WHO | Regional Office for Africa. “The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia Is Over,” May 9, 2015. https://www.afro.who.int/information/ebola-outbreak-liberia-over.

Thompsell. “Key Moments in the History of Liberia.” ThoughtCo, July 24, 2020. https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-liberia-4019127.

Toppenberg-Pejcic, Deborah, Jane Noyes, Tomas Allen, Nyka Alexander, Marsha Vanderford, and Gaya Gamhewage. “Emergency Risk Communication: Lessons Learned from a Rapid Review of Recent Gray Literature on Ebola, Zika, and Yellow Fever.” Health Communication 34, no. 4 (March 21, 2019): 437–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2017.1405488.

Trčková, Dita. “Representations of Ebola and Its Victims in Liberal American Newspapers.” Topics in Linguistics 16, no. 1 (December 1, 2015): 29–41. https://doi.org/10.2478/topling-2015-0009.

Tsai, Lily L., Benjamin S. Morse, and Robert A. Blair. “Building Credibility and Cooperation in Low-Trust Settings: Persuasion and Source Accountability in Liberia During the 2014–2015 Ebola Crisis.” Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 10–11 (September 1, 2020): 1582–1618. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019897698.

Van de Walle, Steven, and Geert Bouckaert. “Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The Problem of Causality.” International Journal of Public Administration 26, no. 8–9 (February 7, 2007): 891–913. https://doi.org/10.1081/PAD-120019352.

Vinck, Patrick, Phuong N Pham, Kenedy Okay Bindu, Juliet Bedford, and Eric J Nilles. “Institutional Trust and Misinformation in the Response to the 2018–19 Ebola Outbreak in North Kivu, DR Congo: A Population-Based Survey.” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 19, no. 5 (March 27, 2019): 529–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(19)30063-5.

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Woldemariam, Yohannes, and Lionel Di Giacomo. “Ebola Epidemic.” Air &amp; Space Power Journal – Africa and Francophonie 7, no. 1 (March 22, 2016): 54–73. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&issn=1931728X&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALEpercent7CA455186429&sid=googleScholar&linkaccess=abs.

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Notes

^[1] Siddique, Haroon, and Sarah Marsh. “Inquiry Announced into Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus on BAME Communities.” The Guardian, April 16, 2020, sec. World information. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/inquiry-disproportionate-impact-coronavirus-bame.

^[2] I take the Western world to typically be comprised of North American and European (principally Western European) developed nations.

^[3] Ali, Harris, Barlu Dumbuya, Michaela Hynie, Pablo Idahosa, Roger Keil, and Patricia Perkins. “The Social and Political Dimensions of the Ebola Response: Global Inequality, Climate Change, and Infectious Disease.” In Climate Change and Health, edited by Walter Leal Filho, Ulisses M. Azeiteiro, and Fátima Alves, 151–69. Page 161. Climate Change Management. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24660-4_10.

^[4] Throughout this Dissertation, the 2011 to 2018 interval is used for the reason that survey information is from that interval. However, the Ebola disaster in Liberia ran from 2014 to 2016.

^[5] Hawkins, Darren G., ed. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Page 7. https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Delegation_and_Agency_in_International_O.html?id=KTIbxACnMgYC&printsec=frontcover&supply=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.

^[6] Editors at Legal Information Institute. “Public Trust Doctrine.” LII / Legal Information Institute, NA. https://www.legislation.cornell.edu/wex/public_trust_doctrine.

^[7]“PUBLIC TRUST | Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary,” NA. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/public-trust.

^[8] Van de Walle, Steven, and Geert Bouckaert. “Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The Problem of Causality.” International Journal of Public Administration 26, no. 8–9 (February 7, 2007): 891–913 (Page 909). https://doi.org/10.1081/PAD-120019352.

^[9] Siisiainen, and Martti. “(PDF) Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam.” ResearchGate, January 1, 2000. Page 1. https://www.researchgate.web/publication/200031251_Two_Concepts_of_Social_Capital_Bourdieu_vs_Putnam.

^[10]Gambetta, Diego. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell, 1988. https://philpapers.org/rec/GAMTMA.

^[11] Sherif, and Maina. “Enhancing Security and Justice in Liberia.” ACCORD (weblog), March 1, 2013. Page 8. https://www.accord.org.za/publication/enhancing-security-and-justice-in-liberia/.

^[12] Podder, Sukanya. “Bridging the ‘Conceptual–Contextual’ Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 353–80 (Page 374). https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.770242.

^[13] Karim, Sabrina. “Restoring Confidence in Post-Conflict Security Sectors: Survey Evidence from Liberia on Female Ratio Balancing Reforms.” British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (June 28, 2017): 799–821 (Page 799). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000035.

^[14] Beekman, Gonne, Erwin Bulte, and Eleonora Nillesen. “Corruption, Investments and Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Rural Liberia.” Journal of Public Economics 115 (July 1, 2014): 37–47 (Page 44). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.004.

^[15] Barker, Kathryn M, Emilia J Ling, Mosoka Fallah, Brian VanDeBogert, Yvonne Kodl, Rose Jallah Macauley, Okay Viswanath, and Margaret E Kruk. “Community Engagement for Health System Resilience: Evidence from Liberia’s Ebola Epidemic.” Health Policy and Planning 35, no. 4 (May 1, 2020): 416–23 (Page 416). https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czz174.

^[16] Tsai, Lily L., Benjamin S. Morse, and Robert A. Blair. “Building Credibility and Cooperation in Low-Trust Settings: Persuasion and Source Accountability in Liberia During the 2014–2015 Ebola Crisis.” Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 10–11 (September 1, 2020): 1582–1618 (Page 1582). https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019897698.

^[17] Vinck, Patrick, Phuong N Pham, Kenedy Okay Bindu, Juliet Bedford, and Eric J Nilles. “Institutional Trust and Misinformation in the Response to the 2018–19 Ebola Outbreak in North Kivu, DR Congo: A Population-Based Survey.” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 19, no. 5 (March 27, 2019): 529–36 (Page 529). https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(19)30063-5.

^[18] Elston, J.W.T., C. Cartwright, P. Ndumbi, and J. Wright. “The Health Impact of the 2014–15 Ebola Outbreak.” Public Health 143 (February 1, 2017): 60–70 (Page 60). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2016.10.020.

^[19] Hofman, Michiel, and Sokhieng Au, eds. The Politics of Fear: Médecins sans Frontières and the West African Ebola Epidemic. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2017. 101-119. https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/4280019/mod_resource/content material/1/Sokhieng%20Au%2Cpercent20Michiel%20Hofman-The%20politicspercent20ofpercent20fearpercent20_percent20MpercentC3percentA9decinspercent20sanspercent20frontipercentC3percentA8respercent20andpercent20thepercent20West%20A.pdf.

^[20] Abramowitz, Sharon, Sarah Lindley McKune, Mosoka Fallah, Josephine Monger, Kodjo Tehoungue, and Patricia A. Omidian. “The Opposite of Denial: Social Learning at the Onset of the Ebola Emergency in Liberia.” Journal of Health Communication 22, no. sup1 (March 2017): 59–65 (Page 64). https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730.2016.1209599.

^[21] Kucharski, A, and P Piot. “Containing Ebola Virus Infection in West Africa.” Eurosurveillance 19, no. 36 (September 11, 2014): 20899. Page 2. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES2014.19.36.20899.

^[22] Ibid

^[23] Woldemariam, Yohannes, and Lionel Di Giacomo. “Ebola Epidemic.” Air &amp; Space Power Journal – Africa and Francophonie 7, no. 1 (March 22, 2016): 54–73. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&issn=1931728X&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALEpercent7CA455186429&sid=googleScholar&linkaccess=abs.

^[24] Roemer-Mahler, Anne, and Simon Rushton. “Introduction: Ebola and International Relations.” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 3 (March 3, 2016): 373–79 (Page 376). https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1118343.

^[25] Southall, Hannah Grace, Sarah E. DeYoung, and Curt Andrew Harris. “Lack of Cultural Competency in International Aid Responses: The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia.” Frontiers in Public Health 5 (January 31, 2017). Page 1. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2017.00005.

^[26] Sarah Monson. “Ebola as African: American Media Discourses of Panic and Otherization.” Africa Today 63, no. 3 (April 1, 2017): 3. Page1. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.63.3.02.

^[27] Ali et al. (2016), Page 161

^[28] Kingsbury, Grace. “(PDF) To What Extent Was the Western Handling of the Ebola Crisis an Example of Neo- Imperialism?” ResearchGate. Accessed August 27, 2020. Page 4. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28397.54242.

^[29] Trčková, Dita. “Representations of Ebola and Its Victims in Liberal American Newspapers.” Topics in Linguistics 16, no. 1 (December 1, 2015): 29–41 (web page 29). https://doi.org/10.2478/topling-2015-0009.

^[30] Gerring, John. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Second version. Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge, United Kingdom New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017. https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CbetAQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Case+examine+analysis:+ideas+and+practices+gerring&ots=kbG6NNMUzH&sig=_-e7Y7jJmPaAFW8lMqEDHGEXpaQ#v=onepage&q=Case%20studypercent20researchpercent3Apercent20principlespercent20andpercent20practicespercent20gerring&f=false.

^[31] Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 219–45. Page 15. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363.

^[32]Shorten, Allison, and Joanna Smith. “Mixed Methods Research: Expanding the Evidence Base.” Evidence Based Nursing 20, no. 3 (July 26, 2017): 74–75. Page 74. https://doi.org/10.1136/eb-2017-102699.

^[33] Dijk, Teun A. van. “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis.” Discourse & Society 4, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 249–83 (Page 257). https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926593004002006.

^[34] Gerring (2006), Page 7

^[35] Foucault. The Order of Discourse, 1970. Page 53. https://www.package.ntnu.no/websites/www.package.ntnu.no/recordsdata/Foucault_The%20Order%20ofpercent20Discourse.pdf.

^[36] Van Dijk (1993), Page 249

^[37] Ibid, Pages 254-255

^[38] Mama, Amina. “Is It Ethical to Study Africa? Preliminary Thoughts on Scholarship and Freedom.” African Studies Review 50, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 1–26 (Page 23). https://doi.org/10.2307/20065338.

^[39] Sirleaf. “Nationwide Statement by Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf President of the Republic of Liberia on the Ebola Virus,” June 8, 2014. Page 2. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Nationwide%20Statement%20onpercent20thepercent20Ebola%20viruspercent20bypercent20thepercent20President%20ofpercent20thepercent20percent20Republic%20ofpercent20Liberia,%20Madam%20Ellen%20Johnson%20Sirleaf(1).pdf.

^[40] Sirleaf. “Special Statement by Ellen Johson Sirleaf On Additional Measures in the Fight against the Ebola Viral Disease,” July 30, 2014. Page 1. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special_State_Delivered_July%2030.pdf.

^[41] Sirleaf. “Nationwide Statement by Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf President of the Republic of Liberia on the Ebola Virus,” September 9, 2014. Page 1. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/WorldBank_Statement.pdf.

^[42] Sirleaf. “Nationwide Statement by Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf President of the Republic of Liberia on the Ebola Virus,” September 9, 2014. Page 2. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/WorldBank_Statement.pdf.

^[43] Ibid

^[44] Sirleaf. “Statement by Her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on the Update of the Ebola Crisis,” September 17, 2014. Page 2. https://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Nation_Address-17092014.pdf.

^[45] Obama, Barack. “Remarks by President Obama at U.N. Meeting on Ebola.” whitehouse.gov, September 25, 2014. Page 1. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-obama-un-meeting-ebola.

^[46] Chan. “WHO | From Crisis to Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak.” WHO. World Health Organization, March 10, 2015. https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/ebola-lessons-lecture/en/.

^[47] “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” July 1, 2020. https://www.imf.org/exterior/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=43&pr.y=8&sy=2013&ey=2020&scsm=1&ssd=1&type=nation&ds=.&br=1&c=668percent2C724percent2C656&s=NGDPD&grp=0&a=.

^[48]Obama, Barack. “Remarks by President Obama at U.N. Meeting on Ebola.” whitehouse.gov, September 25, 2014. Page 1. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-obama-un-meeting-ebola.

^[49] Ibid

^[50] Roemer-Mahler and Rushton (2016).

^[51] Ibid

^[52] Liu, Joanne. “Ebola UN Speech: ‘The Response Remains Totally, and Lethally, Inadequate,’” September 16, 2014. https://www.msf.org.uk/article/ebola-un-speech-response-remains-totally-and-lethally-inadequate.

^[53] Ibid

^[54]Chan. “WHO | From Crisis to Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak.” WHO. World Health Organization, March 10, 2015. Page 1. https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/ebola-lessons-lecture/en/.

^[55] Ibid

^[56] Chan. “WHO | WHO Director-General Addresses Princeton – Fung Global Forum on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Crisis.” WHO. World Health Organization, November 2, 2015. Page 2. http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/princeton-ebola-lessons/en/.

^[57] Chan. “WHO | From Crisis to Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Ebola Outbreak.” WHO. World Health Organization, March 10, 2015. Page 4. https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/ebola-lessons-lecture/en/.

^[58] Ibid

^[59] Monson (2017), Page 1

^[60] “Liberian Ebola Survivor Program Provides Education, Counseling, and Hope | Division of Global Health Protection | Global Health | CDC,” July 12, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/tales/liberia-survivor-program.html.

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Written at: University College London
Written for: Dr. Ali Naghieh (Supervisor)
Date written: September 2020

Further Reading on E-International Relations